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  This paper builds upon recent work by the US Climate Change Science Program (CCSP). 
Among its products, the CCSP developed new emission projections for the major man-made 
greenhouse gases, explored the effects of emission limits on the energy system, and calculated 
the costs of various stabilization constraints to the economy. This paper applies one of the 
models used for that analysis to explore the sensitivity of the results to three potentially critical 
factors: the stabilization level, the policy design, and the availability and costs of low- to zero-
emitting technologies. 
  The major determinant of costs is likely to be something over which we have little 
control – Mother Nature. The choice of stabilization level will reflect our understanding of the 
science of global climate change. We have little control over many of the key bio-geophysical 
processes which, to a major extent, will determine what constitutes dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system.  
  We consider two limits on radiative forcing, corresponding to stabilizing CO2 
concentrations at approximately 450 ppmv and 550 ppmv. These levels have been chosen 
because of the fundamentally different nature of the challenge posed by each. In the case of the 
lower concentration limit, emission reductions will be required virtually immediately and annual 
GDP losses to the US could approach 5%. With the higher concentration limit, the pressure for a 
sharp reduction in near-term emissions is not as great. This offers some potential to reduce GDP 
losses. 
  Indeed, we find that depending upon the concentration limit, implementing market 
mechanisms which take advantage of  “where” and “when” flexibility can markedly reduce GDP 
losses, perhaps by as much as an order of magnitude.  However, for a variety of reasons, our 
ability to realize such savings may be compromised. One possible impediment relates to the 
proximity to the target. If the limit is imminent, flexibility will be greatly reduced. The nature of 
the coalition and our willingness to permit “borrowing” emission rights from the future will also 
affect the magnitude of the potential savings. As a result, the reduction in GDP losses from 
where and when flexibility may turn out to be only a small fraction of what has been previously 
estimated. 
  Fortunately, the biggest opportunity for managing costs may come from something 
over which we do have considerable control. We find that investments in climate friendly 
technologies can reduce GDP losses to the US by a factor of two or more. At present, we have 
insufficient economically competitive substitutes for high carbon emitting technologies. The 
development of low- to zero-emitting alternatives will require both a sustained commitment on 
the part of the public sector upstream in the R&D chain and incentives for the private sector to 
bring the necessary technologies to the marketplace. Aside from helping to assure that 
environmental goals are met in an economically efficient manner, climate policy can also serve 
as an enabler of new technologies.  By recognizing the acute shortage of low-cost substitutes, the 
long lead times required for development and deployment, and the market failures that impede 
technological progress, climate policy can play an important role in reducing the long-term costs 
of the transition. 1 
Managing the Transition to Climate Stabilization 
 




Among the products of the US Climate Change Science Program (CCSP) is an updated 
set of emission scenarios. These describe future emission trajectories for the major man-made 
greenhouse gases (GHGs), the effects of limiting emissions on the energy system and the 
economy, and the economic costs of stabilization.
i The prospectus for the report specified that 
with the exception of the first commitment period, stabilization targets would be met in a manner 
that allowed for “when” and “where” flexibility.
ii That is, there would be flexibility across both 
space and time as to where and when reductions would be made. The implication is that 
reductions will take place both when and where it is economical to do so. The realism of this 
assumption was questioned by reviewers and authors alike, and the report recommended that the 
sensitivity of the results to this assumption be the subject of further study.
iii This extension is a 
major focus of the present analysis. 
We apply one of the three models used in the CCSP update of emission scenarios to 
examine the costs of straying from the economically efficient scenarios specified in report’s 
prospectus. We also explore the relative importance of other assumptions, including choice of 
stabilization levels and the availability and costs of low to zero emitting technologies in the 
energy sector. The analysis is designed to address three questions: What are the determinants of 
costs? Over which factors do we have control? And, are there steps that make sense despite the 
differences in perception about what is at stake – in other words, are there some actions that we 
can all agree upon? 
  Ideally, policy makers would account for not only the costs of an action, but also the 
damages avoided by taking the action. Unfortunately, calculating the benefits of action to 
address climate change is a far more daunting task than calculating the costs. Placing a value on 
environmental goods and services is always difficult; some would question whether given our 
current state of knowledge quantifying benefits is even possible.  In the past, most economic 
analyses which attempted to get at the issue of benefits used a surrogate for damages avoided; 
e.g., reductions in temperature change or sea level rise. In any event, the CCSP limited the focus 
of the scenario analysis to mitigation costs, while holding benefits constant at a given 2 
stabilization level. Accordingly, the current analysis is limited to an examination of mitigation 
costs and not the ensuing benefits. 
In the next section, we briefly describe the modeling framework used both in the CCSP 
exercise and the current effort. We then discuss the nature of the stabilization challenge and the 
choice of limits to be explored. Particular attention is paid to how a constraint on GHG emissions 
can alter the future shape of the energy system. For each stabilization level, we examine 
marginal and total costs of abatement and the relative importance of major contributing factors. 
We conclude with some final comments. 
 
2. The model 
 
  The analysis is based on the MERGE model (a model for evaluating the regional and 
global  effects of greenhouse gas reduction policies). MERGE is an intertemporal general 
equilibrium model. Like its predecessors, the current version (MERGE 5.5) is designed to be 
sufficiently transparent so that one can explore the implications of alternative viewpoints in the 
greenhouse debate. The current analysis utilizes those submodels that provide a reduced-form 
description of the economy, the energy sector, emissions, concentrations, and radiative forcing.  
  MERGE provides a bottom-up representation of the energy supply sector. For a particular 
scenario, a choice is made among specific activities for the generation of electricity and for the 
production of non-electric energy. Oil, gas and coal are viewed as exhaustible resources. There 
are introduction constraints on new technologies and decline constraints on existing 
technologies.  
Geographically, the world is divided into nine geopolitical regions: 1) the USA, 2) 
WEUR (Western Europe), 3) Japan, 4) CANZ (Canada, Australia and New Zealand), 5) EEFSU 
(Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union), 6) China, 7) India, 8) OILX (oil exporting will 
be captured  countries, and 9) ROW (the rest of world). Note the OECD (regions 1-4) together 
with EEFSU constitute Annex B of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.  The 
remaining four regions comprise non-Annex B. MERGE is calibrated to the year 2000. Future 
periods are modeled in 10-year intervals. Hence, the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period 
(2008-2012) is represented as 2010.
iv Economic values are reported in US dollars of constant 
2000 purchasing power. 3 
A distinction is made between electric and nonelectric energy. Table 1 identifies the 
alternative sources of electricity supply. The first five technologies represent sources in operation 
during the base year, 2000. The second group of technologies includes candidates for serving 
electricity needs in 2010 and beyond. Note that rather than try to identify the means by which 
CO2  will be captured, for the present analysis it is sufficient to refer to the process as carbon 
capture and sequestration (CCS). 
We assume that most existing nuclear power plants are retired during the first half of the 
21
st century. For those scenarios where new nuclear power plants are introduced, we assume that 
the cost has both a market and nonmarket component (see Table 1). The latter, which is 
calibrated to current usage, rises proportionally to market share and is intended to represent 
public concerns about environmental risks in the technology and associated nuclear fuel cycle. 
MERGE includes an electric “backstop” category labeled RNW-HC to indicate high-cost 
renewable options. The distinguishing characteristics of the backstop category are 1) a zero GHG 
emissions rate and 2) that once introduced, it is available at a constant marginal cost. Any of a 
number of technologies could be included in this category, e.g., solar photovoltaics, high cost 
wind, and biotechnology. It is intended to represent the fact that we will not run out of energy, 
but as conventional sources are exhausted there are more expensive sources waiting in the wings. 
A number are identified explicitly in the model. However, as we move further out in time and 
further up the supply cost curve, specificity can be sacrificed at little cost. Uncertainty about 
backstop costs are typically dealt with through sensitivity analysis.  
Table 2 identifies alternative sources of nonelectric energy within the model. Notice that 
oil and gas supplies for each region are divided into 10 cost categories. The higher cost  
groups have been added to reflect the potential use of nonconventional sources. With 
regard to carbon-free alternatives, the choices have been divided into two broad categories: 
BFUEL (low-cost biofuels such as ethanol from biomass) and RNW-NE (a high cost renewable 
backstop category including, for example, hydrogen produced via electrolysis using solar 
photovoltaics or hydrogen from thermonuclear dissociation). The key distinction is that BFUEL 
is in limited supply, but RNW-NE is available in unlimited quantities at a constant but 
considerably higher marginal cost. 4 
 
Table 1.  Electricity Generation Technologies Available to US (introduction dates and costs 

























HYDRO Hydroelectric    Existing  40    0.0 
NUC-R Remaining  initial 
nuclear 
Existing 50    0.0 
GAS-R Remaining  initial 
gas fired 
Existing 32    136.0 
OIL-R Remaining  initial 
oil fired 
Existing 37    193.0 
COAL-R Remaining  initial 
coal fired 
Existing 20    227.0 




2020 35   
87.0 
NUC-N New  nuclear  2010  50  10  0.0 
GAS-N Advanced 
combined cycle 




2020 65   
5.4 
COAL-N  New coal without 
CCS 
2010 40    195.5 
COAL-NCS  New coal with 
CCS 
2020 55   11.0 





2010 60   
0.0 





2010 150   
0.0 
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Table 2.  Nonelectric Energy Supplies Available to US (introduction dates and costs may 
differ by region) 









CLDU  Coal – direct uses  2.50  24.1 
OIL-1-10  Oil – 10 cost categories  5.00-7.25  19.9 
GAS-1-10  Gas – 10 cost categories  4.00-6.25  13.7 
BFUEL  Biofuels (e.g., ethanol, 
biodiesel) 
10.00 0.0 
SYNF  Coal based synthetic 
fuels 
8.33 40.0 
RNEW-NHC   Nonelectric high cost 
carbon free renewables, 
e.g. hydrogen via 




Typically, the energy producing and consuming capital stock is long lived. In MERGE, 
introduction and decline constraints are placed on new technologies. We assume that the 
production from new technologies in each region is constrained to 1% of total production in the 
year in which it is initially introduced and can increase by a factor of three for each decade 
thereafter. The decline rate is limited to 3.5% per year for new technologies, but there is no 
decline rate limit for existing technologies. This is to allow for the possibility that some emission 
ceilings may be sufficiently low to force premature retirement of the existing capital stock. 
Turning from the supply to the demand side of the model, we use nested production 
functions to determine how aggregate economic output depends upon the inputs of capital, labor, 
electric and non-electric energy. In this way, the model allows for both price-induced and 
autonomous (non-price) energy conservation and for interfuel substitution. Since there is a 
“putty-clay” formulation, short-run elasticities are smaller than long-run elasticities. This 
increases the costs of rapid short-run adjustments. The model also allows for macroeconomic 
feedbacks. Higher energy and/or environmental costs will lead to fewer resources available for 
current consumption and for investment in the accumulation of capital stocks. 6 
Where international trade in emission rights is permitted, regions with high marginal 
abatement costs can purchase emission rights from regions with low marginal abatement costs.
v 
There is also trade in oil, and gas. Each of the model’s nine regions maximizes the discounted 
utility of its consumption subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. Each region’s wealth 
includes not only capital, labor and exhaustible resources, but also its negotiated international 
share in global emission rights.  
 
3. Definition of reference case and constrained scenarios 
 
  With the exception of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (EEFSU), 
participating countries are assumed to meet the targets imposed by the Kyoto Protocol during the 
first commitment period. Because the decline in economic activity in EEFSU during the 1990s 
has led to a decrease in their carbon dioxide emissions, their Kyoto limits are expected to exceed 
their actual emissions. Hence, these countries will have excess emission rights. In the parlance of 
the climate debate this is commonly referred to as “hot air” or “Russian hot air” denoting the 
country expected to receive the largest number of excess rights. At present, the Protocol permits 
these rights to be sold to countries in search of low-cost options for meeting their own targets. 
We eliminate this unintended possibility by constraining the countries of EEFSU to their 2000 
rather than 1990 emission levels during the first commitment period. Finally, for the US, 
currently a non participant in the protocol, we apply the constraint on GHG intensity adopted by 
the Bush Administration for 2010.  For the remaining periods in our time horizon, reference case 
emissions are unconstrained.  
  For comparison with the reference case, two alternative long-term climate stabilization 
goals are analyzed.  These goals are represented as constraints on the total radiative forcing from 
the Kyoto suite of gases: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), the 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), the perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).  
Analysis of climate policy has gradually evolved from a focus on stabilizing CO2 emissions only, 
to stabilizing CO2 concentrations, to multigas concentration targets. The CCSP moved one step 
further down the causal chain connecting human activities to the things that we care about by 
focusing on stabilizing changes in the earth’s energy balance, or radiative forcing (RF).   
  In accordance with “what flexibility,” all gases are considered when identifying the least 
cost strategy for meeting a particular RF constraint. This raises the issue of establishing 7 
equivalence among multiple gases. Comparison is difficult because each gas has its own lifetime 
and effect on instantaneous forcing. The IPCC has suggested the use of global warming 
potentials (GWPs) to represent the relative contribution of emissions of the different greenhouse 
gases to long term atmospheric radiative forcing.
vi However, a number of studies have pointed 
out the arbitrary nature of GWPs and called for an approach that recognizes the relative 
contribution of each gas over time as it relates to achieving a particular target.
vii Thus the RF 
target approach represents an improvement over concentration targets in that it avoids the need to 
choose an arbitrary measure for making tradeoffs among multiple greenhouse gases. 
  Of the four RF targets chosen by the CCSP, the present analysis focuses on the lower 
two: 3.4 watts/m
2 and 4.7 watts/m
2.  These were found to be consistent with atmospheric CO2 
concentrations on the order of 450 and 550 ppmv, respectively, stabilization levels that have 
received considerable attention in the debate.  Moreover, as the results of our study will 
demonstrate the frontier between “immediate and rapid” action and a “more gradual” approach 
lies in the range defined by these two goals.  
  As noted earlier, the CCSP adopted the assumption that reductions would be allocated 
across space and time in an economically efficient manner. This is referred to in the present 
study as a “1
st best” policy case. We note, however, that many consider this assumption to be 
difficult to implement. Indeed, most proposals currently under consideration do not allow for the 
possibility of borrowing emission rights from the future and place limits on the degree to which 
we might have trading across space. 
  For comparison to the 1
st best case, we will also examine scenarios in which specific 
constraints are placed on Annex B’s year-by-year emissions during the first half of the 21
st 
century. In an attempt to mimic the types of proposals currently under discussion while avoiding 
singling out any specific proposal for analysis, we arbitrarily assume that Annex B carbon 
dioxide emissions are reduced by two percent per year between 2010 and 2050. Furthermore we 
assume that non-Annex B does not join the coalition until 2060 and behaves as if the price of 
carbon is zero through 2050. Figure 1 shows the nature of the constraints. Because neither Annex 
B nor non-Annex B countries pursue least cost emission pathways from a global perspective 
during the transition period, we refer to these as “3
rd best” policy scenarios. Note that the 
arbitrary constraint placed on annual emissions is in addition to the long-term constraint on 
global radiative forcing. 8 
Finally, in order to isolate the benefits from the availability of certain low or zero carbon 
emitting technologies, we explore scenarios with and without the option of new nuclear power 
plants and carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technologies in coming decades.  These two 
scenarios are referred to as “Optimistic” and “Pessimistic,” respectively.  Thus we have 
identified eight cases as distinguished by target, policy and technology availability. These are 
summarized in Figure 2. We now turn to the examination of the modeling results. 
 
 
4. The implications of the long-term goal for near-term emissions 
 
  The sharp distinction between the two radiative forcing targets chosen for analysis 
becomes immediately apparent from Figure 3. The figure shows the time path for total radiative 
forcing under reference case emissions. Notice that with the tighter target (3.4 watts/m
2), the 
constraint becomes binding within the next few decades, whereas with a constraint of 4.7 
watts/m
2, the constraint does not become binding until the second half of the century.  This has 
implications for how quickly we must act - that is, the potential benefits from “when” flexibility. 
Figure 4 shows global carbon emissions under the reference or business-as-usual (BAU) 
case and the constrained cases. The figure suggests with a 3.4 watts/m
2 constraint there is little 
room for when flexibility.  From a global perspective, the 3
rd best policy is only barely more 
aggressive during the first half of the 21
st century than the 1
st best policy.   
Conversely, with a radiative forcing constraint of 4.7 watts/m
2, there is a clear distinction 
between the emission pathways under the 1
st best and 3
rd best policies.  In this case, the 2% per 
annum transition constraint causes Annex B to reduce its emissions below that required by the 
long-term constraint in the early decades. That is, there is still some flexibility in the choice of 
emissions pathway. 
By definition, the 3rd best policy will be more costly than the 1st best policy in meeting 
our environmental goals. The question is how much more costly. The analysis suggests that the 
fewer the degrees of freedom in terms of the timing of emission reductions, that is the closer we 
are to hitting the constraint, the more the 3
rd best policy must resemble the 1st best policy. 
However, we note that even if the two paths were identical, the costs of the policies will differ. 
This is because in the case of the 3
rd best policy non-Annex B countries do not join the coalition 
until post-2050. Hence, we have limited where flexibility.  But before pursuing the matter of 9 
costs further, it will be useful to look at the implications of the various constraints for the energy 
system. 
 
5. Alternative energy futures 
 
In this section, we explore how a constraint on near-term GHG emissions or on long-term 
radiative forcing may alter the future shape of the energy system. Previously, we discussed some 
of the crucial characteristics of the technologies which will drive investment decisions, including 
costs, availability and public acceptance. It is often said when referring to emissions abatement 
that there will be no “silver bullet,” and that the solution will be comprised of a number of 
technologies on both the supply and demand side of the energy system. This is likely to be so, 
but nonetheless, some technologies may play a larger role than others in the management of 
costs. Two candidates high up on many lists are carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) and 
nuclear power. Although each confronts substantial hurdles, if successful they could make an 
important contribution to our energy future.  
These zero- to low-emitting technologies can serve as alternatives to electric technologies 
that freely emit CO2 into the atmosphere (see Table 1). They also can have an impact through 
interfuel substitution on the nonelectric sector. Hence, it is necessary to look at the entire energy 
system to understand their potential roles in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The two panels 
which comprise Figure 5 show the electric and nonelectric sectors under the assumptions that 
both CCS and nuclear power will be available. The figure is for the 3
rd best policy case. That is, 
we have annual limits on Annex B emissions through 2050 and non-Annex B joins the coalition 
in 2060.  
Let’s begin with the electricity reference case. Notice that in the absence of a constraint 
on carbon emissions, coal (without CO2 capture and sequestration) continues to be the major 
source of electric power in the US. Indeed, production triples over the course of the century with 
coal maintaining a 50% market share. As the natural gas share diminishes, nuclear power and 
low cost renewables, mainly wind power, become major sources of electricity. 
The results indicate that with the 4.7 watts/m
2 constraint on radiative forcing, the price of 
carbon will rise sufficiently that it becomes economical to generate electricity from new coal 
plants with carbon capture and sequestration technology. Indeed, there is even some retrofitting 10 
of existing coal with post-combustion removal and sequestration technology. Note that whereas 
nuclear power is economical in its own right in the base case, CCS requires a price on carbon to 
be competitive.  
Interestingly, the share of CCS declines relative to that of nuclear as we move to the 3.4 
watts/m
2 constraint on radiative forcing. Recall that we assume that 95% of the CO2 is removed 
with this technology. Nevertheless, the remaining 5% proves to be too much to adhere to the 
target. Hence, in comparison with the 4.7 watts/m
2 constraint, some of the CCS must be replaced 
by nuclear. 
Notice in the lower panel of Figure 5 that the reference case includes substantial reliance 
on coal-based synthetic fuels which replace oil as supplies are exhausted and its price rises. In 
the stabilization scenarios, coal-based synthetics are no longer a viable alternative. Whereas they 
may be a relatively inexpensive alternative to oil in a world which places zero price on carbon, 
they become uneconomical as the price of carbon rises. The alternatives are increased 
dependence on natural gas which was previously used to produce electricity, biofuels which are 
in limited supply, the high cost non electric backstop, e.g., hydrogen produced via electrolysis 
using photovoltaics, and substituting electricity for nonelectric energy where economical. The 
latter provides at least a partial explanation for the negligible fall in electricity demand in Figure 
5. 
Figure 6 shows the extent to which electric energy is substituted for nonelectric energy in 
both the optimistic and pessimistic technology scenarios. In each case, the price of nonelectric 
energy rises faster than that of electricity. While there may be some conservation of traditional 
electricity services, it is offset by increased substitution of electricity for traditionally nonelectric 
services. This dynamic is particularly apparent under the optimistic technology case (i.e., with 
CCS and nuclear power). 
Figure 7 shows the energy sector in a world absent the use of CCS and nuclear power. In 
the upper panel, the base case again consists of continued heavy dependence on coal without 
capture and sequestration. Whereas the share of freely emitting coal remains high there is also 
greater reliance on natural gas and renewables. This is necessary to replace the contribution 
previously made by new nuclear power, which is prohibited in the “pessimistic technology” 
scenarios depicted in Figure 7. Also note the substantial drop in demand relative to the earlier 
base case (Figure 5). This reflects a substantial rise in electricity prices. 11 
With the imposition of a constraint on radiative forcing, we begin to see the emergence of 
high cost renewables which are three to four times more costly than freely emitting coal 
technologies. With such a sharp rise in the price of electricity, the role of price induced 
conservation rises considerably. Hence, we see a major decline in electricity demand. This 
decline is further exacerbated by the disincentive for interfuel substitution due to the higher 
electricity prices. 
 
6. Marginal and total costs 
 
We next take a closer look at the price of carbon corresponding to the various 
stabilization scenarios. These carbon prices describe how much we would be willing to pay to 
emit an additional ton of carbon and provide important insight into the relative importance of our 
two constraints: the annual constraint on emissions and the long-term constraint on radiative 
forcing. Figure 8 shows the carbon prices for each of our eight scenarios. The top and bottom 
panels refer to the 3.4 watts/m
2 and the 4.7 watts/m
2 constraints, respectively. 
Consider first the upper panel, which shows, as we would expect, higher prices overall 
than in the lower panel. With the tighter constraint, the price of emission rights rise at a constant 
rate during the first half of the century in each scenario. This suggests that in the 3
rd best case, 
prices are being driven by the long-term constraint on radiative forcing and not the year-by-year 
constraint on Annex B emissions. When only the radiative forcing constraint is binding, carbon 
prices will rise until the “backstop technology” is available at constant marginal cost. With an 
introduction constraint on the backstop technology, there will be some overshoot followed by a 
decline to the carbon price dictated by the backstop cost. For each path, the rate at which carbon 
prices rise is such that the discounted marginal cost of a ton of carbon is virtually identical in 
each period.  Notice that the price paths are higher in the 3
rd best cases. This is due to the fact 
that non-Annex B is not participating in the coalition until the second half of the century. Hence, 
Annex B is initially carrying the entire burden. 
The lower panel in Figure 8 contrasts sharply with the upper panel. In particular, notice 
the erratic price path during the transition period (2010-2050) for the 4.7 watts/m
2 constraint on 
radiative forcing. Here, Annex B countries are responding predominantly to the year-by-year 
constraint on annual carbon emissions during the first half of the century. That is, the long-term 12 
global constraint on radiative forcing would not by itself require a reduction in emissions 
sufficient to meet the annual emission constraint. With the carbon price path governed by the 
annual constraint, we no longer see gradually rising prices during the first half of the century. In 
2050 Annex B faces its tightest annual constraint; hence the sharp spike in the carbon price. The 
peak is exacerbated by the assumption that Annex B knows that non-Annex B will join the 
coalition post-2050 and that there will be a relaxation in its own transition constraint at that point 
in time. The dramatic drop in price reflects the transition to global when and where flexibility.
viii
It is also interesting to look at the impact of the constraint on GDP. Figure 9 shows 
annual US GDP losses for our various scenarios. Scenarios with the 3.4 watts/m
2 radiative 
forcing constraint are shown in the upper panel, with the 4.7 watts/m
2 radiative forcing constraint 
scenarios shown in the lower panel. Not surprisingly, the magnitude of the losses is highest for 
the tighter RF constraint. If we adopt the pessimistic technology scenario and assume a 3
rd best 
policy approach, the costs of stabilization at the 3.4 watts/m
2 target rise to nearly 5 percent of 
annual GDP in mid-century. For a given target, GDP losses may be reduced either by 
introducing policy flexibility or by introducing new technology.  Note that there is a temporal 
element to the choice of approaches to reducing losses. During the first half of the century losses 
are most effectively reduced by focusing on the policy design. Conversely, during the second 
half of the century, the benefits from the policy choice decline as those from technology 
availability expand. This does not imply, however, that our initial focus should be exclusively on 
policy design followed by one on technology. To the extent that technology leadtimes imply 
near-term R&D, our initial focus needs to be both on policy design and technological innovation. 
 
7.  A “2nd best” policy
 
The 3
rd best policy case represents two separate departures from the 1st best policy during 
the transition period (the first half of the present century).  The first is the non-participation of 
developing countries, who behave as if the carbon price is zero through 2050.  The second is the 
constraint on Annex B, overlaid on the long-term stabilization target, requiring a continuation of 
“Kyoto-style” reductions (annual targets) for the first half of the century.  It is interesting to 
examine the relative importance of these two suboptimal components.  We therefore construct an 
intermediate “2
nd best” policy scenario, in which developing countries remain outside the 13 
transition coalition but Annex B is no longer bound by the year-by-year reduction constraints.  
However, to facilitate comparison, we impose the constraint that global radiative forcing by 2050 
must not exceed the level achieved by that time period in the 3
rd best policy case.  In other 
words, we apply the transition policies shown in Figure 1 only in terms of their end result, the 
radiative forcing at mid-century, and not in terms of a prescribed timetable of reductions, 
allowing Annex B when  flexibility in meeting the intermediate target.  Thus the effects of 
bearing the burden alone can be separated from the effects of an arbitrary timetable. 
The results of the 2
nd best analysis depend entirely on the choice of stabilization target.  
In the case of the tighter 3.4 watts/m
2 target, the transition constraints on Annex B are barely 
binding, so removing them makes little difference; the 2
nd and 3
rd best policy scenarios are 
identical in this case. This observation highlights the importance of developing country 
participation in relation to the tighter target.  All differences between the 3
rd best and 1
st best 
solutions in this case are due to the limited size of the transition coalition.  By contrast, in the 4.7 
watts/m
2 stabilization scenario, relaxation of the transition timetable makes a big difference.  
Figure 10 shows the carbon price with a 4.7 watts/m
2 target for all three policy scenarios (and 
optimistic technology assumptions).  The 1
st best and 3
rd best price paths are the same as those 
shown in the lower panel of Figure 8.  The 2
nd best price path is only slightly higher than in the 
1
st best case during the transition period, demonstrating the value of even partial when flexibility. 
For the 4.7 watts/m
2 stabilization scenario, the remaining effects from the non-participation of 
developing countries are comparatively small, implying that most of the difference between the 
3
rd best and 1
st best solutions in this case is due to the over-aggressive abatement schedule in 
Annex B for the higher stabilization level. 
 
8. Relative influence of various factors on cost
 
Finally, in our last figure (Figure 11), we examine GDP losses at a global level, 
discounted back to the present.  The figure provides a summary of our analysis. Notice that the 
largest determinant of losses is something over which we may have little control—Mother 
Nature. That is, if we assume that ultimately the RF target will be based on a better 
understanding of the science underlying global warming and that this understanding will 
determine what constitutes “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system,” then 14 
the resolution of uncertainty surrounding such issues as climate sensitivity, the thermohaline 
circulation, sea level rise, etc. will ultimately determine the appropriate target.  
  The second largest determinant of costs and the one over which we do have control is 
technology. If a transformation of the global energy system turns out to be required, trillions of 
dollars are at stake. At the present time, there are insufficient supplies of low cost substitutes for 
high carbon emitting technologies. Currently we are limited primarily to fuel switching and price 
induced conservation, both of which will come with a sizeable price tag.  To develop the 
technological wherewithal to do the heavy lifting in the future is essential for managing the costs 
of the transition. This will require both a sustained commitment on the part of the public sector 
upstream in the R&D chain and incentives for the private sector to bring the necessary 
technologies to the marketplace. 
Finally, there is the issue of the design of climate policy. The cost comparison reveals 
that in the current formulation, policy choice plays a smaller role than either the stabilization 
target or the state of technology.  Moreover, note that the entire gain from policy flexibility is 
obtained without developing country participation in the 2
nd best case with the 4.7 watts/m
2 
target, while including these countries accounts for the entire gain in the 3.4 watts/m
2 
stabilization scenario.  Even though it ranks third in this analysis, the difference between 
economically efficient and inefficient policy is still on the order of trillions of dollars.  But the 
main contribution of climate policy may be as an enabler of new technologies.  By recognizing 
the acute shortage of low-cost substitutes, the long lead times required for development and 
deployment, and the market failures that impede technological progress, climate policy can play 
an important role in reducing the costs of the transition. 
 
9. Some final comments
 
As climate negotiators continue the struggle to agree upon a set of goals for climate 
policy, the debate appears to be becoming even more polarized. This may seem surprising given 
the growing consensus among the scientific community that something should be done and done 
soon. Upon reflection, however, the widening gulf should be expected. The calls for action are 
being accompanied by demands for increasingly tighter constraints on greenhouse gas emissions 
and hence, both sides of the debate see the stakes increasing.  15 
Of course, the “stakes” tend to be perceived differently depending upon one’s 
perspective. The activists are concerned that we are imposing an unacceptable risk on the 
environment. To them, the very ecosystem, and its ability to provide the services to which we are 
accustomed, is at stake. The climate skeptics, even those who acknowledge the need for some 
action, fear that the types of actions that are being suggested will impose an unacceptable and 
unnecessary burden on our economy and in doing so will divert attention from more pressing 
social needs. 
The real question is not whether to take action but how much action to take. 
Unfortunately, given the deep and pervasive uncertainties that both sides acknowledge, the 
problem does not lend itself to a simple solution. The issue is one of risk management, that is, 
how much insurance we should buy to reduce the risks associated with climate change. Here the 
answer will hinge upon one’s perception of the stakes, the odds, and how risk averse we choose 
to be as a society. Our analysis focuses on one part of the risk management calculus: the costs of 
































































Figure 1.  3
rd Best Transition Constraints for Annex B 
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Figure 2.  Scenario Design for Analysis 
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Figure 3.  Global Radiative Forcing in Reference Case Relative to Stabilization Targets 

































Figure 4.  Global Carbon Emissions in Reference and Policy Scenarios 
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Figure 5.  U.S. Energy Sector Profiles in Optimistic Technology Scenario 











2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
BAU


















Figure 6.  U.S. Electric Sector Share of Primary Energy (EJ) 
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Figure 7.  U.S. Energy Sector Profile in Pessimistic Technology Scenario 
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Figure 8.  Annex B Carbon Price under Alternative Scenarios 
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Figure 10.  Annex B Carbon Price under 4.7 W/m
2 RF Target  
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Figure 11.  Total Global Economic Cost through 2200 Discounted to 2000 at 5% 
    
                                                 
i See http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap2-1/default.php
ii See http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap2-1/sap2-1prospectus-final.htm/  
iii See http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap2-1/public-review-draft/
iv Conference of the Parties, “Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change”, Report of the Conference of the Parties, Third Session Kyoto, 1-10 December, 
FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add1. http://www.unfccc.de. 
v In MERGE, emissions can be limited either directly in each region or by a carbon tax with “lump sum” 
recycling of revenue. When the carbon taxes resulting from a particular cap and trade scheme are used as 
inputs to control emissions, they produce identical regional emissions that were inputs under cap and trade. 
vi IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) (1996). Climate Change 1995, Report of Working 
Group III, Cambridge University Press, UK. 
vii Manne, A. S. and R. G. Richels (2001). “An Alternative Approach to Establishing Trade-offs Among 
Greenhouse Gases”, Nature, 410, 675-677. 
viii  Low carbon technologies involve investments which persist for decades, and therefore the cost of new 
abatement measures at the end of the transition period are magnified because firms consistently anticipate 
that with accession of non-Annex B countries, future carbon prices will be lower.  A higher carbon tax is 
required at the end of the transition period in order to induce abatement measures which only serve to 
reduce carbon emissions in one or two time periods. 
   